Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates

John Addison (), C.R. Barrett and Stan Siebert ()

Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham

Abstract: The paper constructs an asymmetric information model to investugate the efficiency and equity cases for government mandated benefits. A mandate can improve workers' ibsurance, and may also redistribute in favour of more "deserving" workers.

Keywords: INFORMATION; LABOUR; EFFICIENCY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
View citations in EconPapers

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates (2005)
Working Paper: Building Blocks in the Economics of Mandates (2005)
Journal Article: Building blocks in the economics of mandates (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bir:birmec:00-07

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Colin Rowat ().