Values for Cooperative Games over Graphs and Games With Inadmissible Coalitions
Ziv Hellman () and
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Ziv Hellman: Bar-Ilan University
No 2015-04, Working Papers from Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics
We suppose that players in a cooperative game are located within a graph structure, such as a social network or supply route, that limits coalition formation to coalitions along connected subsets within the graph. This in turn leads to a more general study of coalitional games in which there are arbitrary limitations on the collections of coalitions that may be formed. Within this context we define a generalisation of the Shapley value that is studied from an axiomatic perspective. The resulting ‘graph value’ (and ‘S-value’ in the general case) is endogenously asymmetric, with the automorphism group of the graph playing a crucial role in determining the relative values of players.
Keywords: Shapley value; network games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D46 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-net
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