Political Pressure Deflection

James Anderson () and Maurizio Zanardi ()

No 594, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: Much economic policy is deliberately shifted away from direct political processes to administrative processes - political pressure deflection. Pressure deflection poses a puzzle to standard political economy models which suggest that having policies to 'sell' is valuable to politicians. The puzzle is solved here by showing that incumbents will favor pressure deflection since it can deter viability of a challenger, essentially like entry deterrence. U.S. trade policy since 1934 provides a prime example, especially antidumping law and its evolution.

Keywords: pressure deflection; elections; antidumping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-reg
Date: 2004-02-28
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Working Paper: Political Pressure Deflection (2004)
Working Paper: Political pressure deflection (2004)
Journal Article: Political pressure deflection (2009)
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