Political patronage in Ukranian banking

Christopher Baum (), Mustafa Caglayan (), Dorothea Schäfer and Oleksandr Talavera

No 657, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper empirically investigates the link between political patronage and bank performance for Ukraine during 2003Q3-2005Q2. We find significant differences between politically affiliated and non-affiliated banks. The data suggest that affiliated banks have significantly lower interest margins. The gap between affiliated banks' and non-affiliated banks' capitalization ratios, is narrowing over time. Parliamentary deputies might use financial institutions to achieve political goals which reduces their banks' performance.

Keywords: Political patronage; Ukraine; banking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cfn, nep-cwa and nep-eff
Date: 2007-02-14, Revised 2008-02-13
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Published, Economics of Transition, 16(3), 2008, 537-557; earlier version published (in German) as "Ukrainische Banken: Politische Patronage von Bedeutung", Wochenbericht Nr. 23/2007, DIW Berlin, pp. 367-371.

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Journal Article: Political patronage in Ukrainian banking (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:657

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