Parliamentary Election Cycles and the Turkish Banking Sector

Christopher Baum (), Mustafa Caglayan () and Oleksandr Talavera

No 705, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effects of parliamentary election cycles on the Turkish banking system. Using annual bank-level data representing all banks in Turkey during 1963-2005, we find that there are meaningful differences in the structure of assets, liabilities and financial performance across different stages of the parliamentary election cycle. However, we find that government-owned banks operate similarly to both domestic and foreign-owned private sector banks before, during and after elections. Our estimates also show that government-owned banks underperform their domestic and foreign-owned private sector counterparts.

Keywords: elections; state banks; domestic banks; foreign-owned banks; loans; interest rate margin (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-ban, nep-cwa and nep-pol
Date: 2009-02-12, Revised 2009-11-06
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Related works:
Working Paper: Parliamentary Election Cycles and the Turkish Banking Sector (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:705

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