Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models

Hervé Crès and M. Utku Ünver
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Hervé Crès: Institut d’Études Politiques de Paris

No 716, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: When aggregating individual preferences through the majority rule in an n-dimensional spatial voting model, the ‘worst-case’ scenario is a social choice configuration where no political equilibrium exists unless a super majority rate as high as 1 − 1/n is adopted. In this paper we assume that a lower d-dimensional (d < n) linear map spans the possible candidates’ platforms. These d ‘ideological’ dimensions imply some linkages between the n political issues. We randomize over these linkages and show that there almost surely exists a 50%-majority equilibria in the above worst-case scenario, when n grows to infinity. Moreover the equilibrium is the mean voter. The speed of convergence (toward 50%) of the super majority rate guaranteeing existence of equilibrium is computed for d = 1 and 2.

Keywords: Spatial voting; super majority; ideology; mean voter theorem; random point set. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm and nep-pol
Date: 2008-09-17

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Related works:
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models (2006)
Working Paper: Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models (2005)
Working Paper: Ideology and existence of 50%-majority equilibria in multidimensional spatial voting models (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:716

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