The 'Boston' School-Choice Mechanism

Fuhito Kojima () and Utku Unver
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Fuhito Kojima: Stanford University, Postal: Dept. of Economics, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 USA

No 729, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: The Boston mechanism is a popular student-placement mechanism in school-choice programs around the world. We provide two characterizations of the Boston mechanism. We introduce a new axiom, respect of preference rankings. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism for some priority if and only if it respects preference rankings and satisfies consistency, resource monotonicity, and an auxiliary invariance property. In environments where each type of object has exactly one unit, as in house allocation, a characterization is given by respect of preference rankings, individual rationality, population monotonicity, and the auxiliary invariance property.

Keywords: Mechanism design; matching; school choice; market design; Boston mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-dcm, nep-gth and nep-ure
Date: 2010-02-04, Revised 2010-10-08
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