Delegation and Product Differentiation
Luca Lambertini ()
Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna
The effects of the delegation of control to managers are investigated in a duopolistic market for differentiated goods. It appears that delegation is profitable to shareholders under Cournot competiton, provided that the rival firm maximizes profit.
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:173
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