Supplementary Insurance with Ex-Post Moral Hazard: Efficiency and Redistribution
Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna
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Journal Article: Supplementary Insurance with 'ex post' moral hazard: efficiency and redistribution (2006)
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