Profitability of Horizontal Mergers in the Presence of Price Stickiness
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Hamideh Esfahani () and
Hadi Salehi Esfahani ()
Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna
In this paper, we investigate the profitability of horizontal mergers of firms with price adjustments. We take a di¤erential game approach and both the open-loop as well as the closed-loop equlibria are considered. We show that the merger incentive is determined by how fast the price adapts to the equilibrium level.
JEL-codes: C73 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp747
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Task Force CeSIA DSE ().