Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites

Anders Akerman (), Anna Larsson Seim () and Alireza Naghavi ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper studies how comparative advantage and the political elites' endowments shape long-run performance in an economy with imperfect political institutions. In a capital-scarce economy, an autocrat catering to the needs of landowners favours openness to trade at an early stage of development, while an autocrat complying with the preferences of capitalists chooses to shelter the economy from trade. The trade regime interacts with economic institutions, and with policies on capital mobility, to govern capital accumulation. A landed autocrat neglects to improve institutions and blocks foreign capital to maximize extractable rents, leading the economy towards stagnation. By contrast, a capitalist autocrat strengthens institutions, which promotes manufacturing TFP growth, gradually shifts the comparative advantage towards manufacturing and renders the economy attractive to foreign investors. Allowing for trade and foreign capital inflows are thus complementary policies that provide an environment of growth and development in the capital autocracy.

JEL-codes: F10 F20 P40 P50 O10 O24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Date: 2011-07
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Related works:
Working Paper: Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites (2011)
Working Paper: Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites (2011)
Working Paper: Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites (2011)
Working Paper: Autocracies and Development in a Global Economy: A Tale of Two Elites (2011)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp775

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