Collusion via Resale

Thomas Troger (), Rod Garratt () and Charles Zheng

Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract: The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the spoils by optimally reselling the good to the other bidders. These equilibria interim Pareto dominate (among bidders) the standard value-bidding equilibrium, without requiring the bidders to make any commitment on bidding behavior or post-bidding spoil-division.

Keywords: English auction; resale; collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-gth
Date: 2008-10
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ftp://web.bgse.uni-bonn.de/pub/RePEc/bon/bonedp/bgse20_2008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Collusion via Resale (2007)
Journal Article: Collusion via Resale (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse20_2008

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