Performance of Procrastinators: On the Value of Deadlines

Fabian Herweg () and Daniel Müller ()

Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract: Earlier work has shown that procrastination can be explained by quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We present a model of effort choice over time that shifts the focus away from completion to performance on a single task. We show that quasi-hyperbolic discounting is detrimental for performance. More intrestingly, we find that being aware of the own self-control problems not necessarily increases performance. Extending this framework to a multi-task model, we show that deadlines help an agent to structure his workload more efficiently, which in turn leads to better performance. Moreover, being restricted by deadlines increases a quasi-hyperbolic discounter's well-being. Thus, we give a theoretical underpinning for recent empirical evidence and numerous casual observations.

Keywords: Effort Choice; Deadlines; (Quasi-) Hyperbolic Discounting; Naiveté; Present-Biased Preferences; Sophistication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A12 D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ppm
Date: 2008-01-23
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://web.bgse.uni-bonn.de/pub/RePEc/bon/bonedp/bgse3_2008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse3_2008

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Germany
Address: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Series data maintained by Daniel Park ().