Self-Correcting Mechanisms in Public Procurement: Why Award and Contract Should be Separated

Dieter Bös and Martin Kolmar ()

Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract: In public procurement a temporal separation of award and actual contracting can frequently be observed. In this paper we give an explanation for this institutional setting. For incomplete procurement contracts we show that such a separation may increase efficiency. We show that efficiency can be increased by post-award, pre-contract negotiations between the award-winning seller and one of the `losing' sellers. Surprisingly, the efficiency gains can be higher if the award is given to a seller with a lower reputation for quality instead of to a seller with higher reputation. Under certain conditions post-award, pre-contract rent-seeking activities also increase efficiency. This is always the case if the procurement agency is corrupt, but may also occur in the case of lobbying.

Keywords: Procurement; Incomplete contracts; lobbying; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 H57 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pub and nep-reg
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Related works:
Working Paper: Self-Correcting Mechanisms in Public Procurement: Why Award and Contract Should be Separated (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse5_2000

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