Job Assignments, Intrinsic Motivation and Explicit Incentives

Julia Nafziger

Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract: This paper considers the interplay of job assignments with the intrinsic and extrinsic motivation of an agent. Job assignments influence the self confidence of the agent, and thereby his intrinsic motivation. Monetary reward allow the principal to complement intrinsic motivation with extrinsic incentives. The main result is that the principal chooses an inefficient job assignment rule to enhance the agent's intrinsic motivation even though she can motivate him with monetary rewards. This shows that, in the presence of intrinsically motivated agents, it is not possible to separate job assignment decisions from incentive provision.

Keywords: Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation; Job Assignments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J31 J33 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-hap and nep-lab
Date: 2008-02
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