Trial & Error to Collusion - The Discrete Case

Steffen Huck, Hans-Theo Normann () and Jörg Oechssler

Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract: In this note we study a very simple trial & error learning process in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. Without any knowledge of the payoff functions players increase, respectively decrease, their quantity by one unit as long as this leads to higher profits. We show that despite the absence of any coordination or punishing device this process converges to a collusive outcome.

Keywords: learning; Cournot oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-ind
Date: 2000-05
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