Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation?

Stephanie Rosenkranz () and Patrick W. Schmitz

Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract: The fact that according to the celebrated Coase Theorem rational parties always try to exploit all gains from trade is usually taken as an argument against the necessity of government intervention through Pigouvian taxation in order to correct externalities. However, we show that the hold-up problem, which occurs if non-verifiable investments have external effects and parties cannot be prevented from always exploiting ex post gains from trade through Coasean bargaining, may be solved by government intervention. In this sense, the impossibility to rule out Coasean bargaining (after investments are sunk) may in fact justify Pigouvian taxation.

Keywords: Hold-up problem; Bargaining; Contracts; Taxation; Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D62 H21 H23 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-res
Date: 2006-02
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Related works:
Working Paper: Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? (2004)
Working Paper: Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? (2004)
Journal Article: Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse7_2006

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