Cooperation as a Result of Learning with Aspiration Levels

Jörg Oechssler

Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract: It is shown that a win-stay, lose-hift behavior rule with endogenous aspiration levels yields cooperation in a certain class of games. The aspiration level in each round equals the current population average. The class of games includes the prisoner's dilemma and Cournot oligopoly and thus yields an explanation for cooperation and collusion.

Keywords: cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-gth
Date: 2001-02
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Journal Article: Cooperation as a result of learning with aspiration levels (2002)
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