Blowing the Whistle

Jose Apesteguia (), Martin Dufwenberg and Reinhard Selten

Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract: Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, theoretically and experimentally.

Keywords: Anti-trust; leniency; immunity; amnesty; blow the whistle; cartels; price competition; Bertrand model; experiment; communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Date: 2003-04
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://web.bgse.uni-bonn.de/pub/RePEc/bon/bonedp/bgse9_2003.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Blowing the Whistle (2003)
Working Paper: Blowing the Whistle (2003)
Journal Article: Blowing the Whistle (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse9_2003

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Bonn Econ Discussion Papers from University of Bonn, Germany
Address: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Series data maintained by Daniel Park ().