Contracts for Health Services: Quality Versus Excess Capacity

Dieter Boumls and Gianni De Fraja ()

Discussion Paper Serie A from University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of non-contractability of investment on the choices made by a health authority and the hospital with which it contracts for the provision of a specific service. We deal with a situation where the parties must write a short-term contract, that is, where they are prevented from signing a contract before making their investment choices. For this reason inefficiency emerges: the service quality chosen by the hospital is too low, and the health authority relies too much on outside providers.

Keywords: Health Services; Incomplete Contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-08

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:bonsfa:578

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Serie A from University of Bonn, Germany
Address: Bonn Graduate School of Economics, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24 - 26, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Series data maintained by Daniel Park ().