Strategic Mismatches in Sequential Contracting: The Case of Professional Partnerships

Matthias Kräkel ()

Discussion Paper Serie A from University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract: Mismatches typically arise because of information problems in markets. This paper discusses the possibility of mismatching in partnerships focussing on strategic mismatches that cannot be explained by information problems. It is shown that due to market competition sometimes players can profit from voluntary mismatching.

Keywords: economies of scope; free-rider effect; loser's curse; mismatch; partnership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D21 J41 J44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-07

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:bonsfa:604

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