Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces

Jörg Oechssler and Frank Riedel ()

Discussion Paper Serie A from University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract: The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this unsatisfying restriction is unnecessary. We specify a simple condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for the case of infinte strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide new conditions for the stability of rest points and show that even strict equilibria may be unstable. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, linear-quadratic games, the harvest preemption game, and games with mixed strategies.

Keywords: replicator dynamics; evolutionary stability; continuous strategy spaces (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-11
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ftp://web.bgse.uni-bonn.de/pub/RePEc/bon/bonsfa/bonsfa606.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces (1998)
Working Paper: Evolutionary Dynamics on Infinite Strategy Spaces
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:bonsfa:606

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