Arbitration And Chilling: Challenging the Convention

Gary E. Bolton ()

Discussion Paper Serie B from University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract: I report here on a series of laboratory tests aimed at a long standing puzzle concerning the impact of arbitration on bargaining behavior. The findings outline a fresh solution. The arbitration puzzle is closely linked to the debate over why disputes arise in bargaining, and so the work speaks to this larger issue as well. The findings are consistent with Scheeling's view that bargaining is essentially a struggle to establish commitment. The link to arbitration illustrates the potential gains to a deeper understanding of this struggle, although the experiments suggest that deeper understanding requires nem models that grapple with what bargainers learn from negotiation.

Date: Written

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