An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game

Rosemarie Nagel () and Nicolaas J. Vriend ()

Discussion Paper Serie B from University of Bonn, Germany

Abstract: We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firms in the same market of a homogenous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well-specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of players in such a situation.

Keywords: Extensive Form Games; Perfect Recall (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-07
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Related works:
Working Paper: An Experimental Study of Adaptive Behavior in an Oligopolistic Market Game (1997)
Journal Article: An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game (1999)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:bonsfb:408

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