Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships

Oliver D. Hart

The Centre for Market and Public Organisation from Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: The question of what should determine the boundaries between public and private firms in an advanced capitalist economy is a highly topical one. In this paper I discuss some recent theoretical thinking on this issue. I divide the paper into two parts. First, I make some general remarks about the relationship between the theoretical literature of privatization and incomplete contracting theories of the firm. Second, I use some of the ideas from this literature to develop a very preliminary model of public-private partnerships.

Keywords: organizational behaviour; scope of government; publicly provided goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 H1 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-mfd
Date: 2002-07
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Journal Article: Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership: Remarks, and an Application to Public-Private Partnerships (2003)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:cmpowp:02/061

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