Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment

Paul A. Grout and Wendelin Schnedler

The Centre for Market and Public Organisation from Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: How does the environment of an organization influence whether workers voluntarily provide effort? We study the power relationship between a non-profit unit (e.g. university department, NGO, health trust), where workers care about the result of their work, and a bureaucrat, who supplies some input to the non-profit unit, but has opportunity costs in doing so (e.g. Dean of faculty, corrupt representative, government agency). We find that marginal changes in the balance of power eventually have dramatic effects on donated labor. We also identify when strengthening the non-profit unit decreases and when it increases donated labor.

Keywords: donated labor; intrinsic motivation; non-profit organizations; power within organizations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J32 H11 H42 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-soc
Date: 2008-09
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http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmpo/publications/papers/2008/wp202.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment (2008)
Working Paper: Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment (2008)
Working Paper: Non-Profit Organizations in a Bureaucratic Environment (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:cmpowp:08/202

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