Reputation and Ownership of Public Goods

Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka () and Evagelos Pafilis ()

The Centre for Market and Public Organisation from Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of reputation on ownership of public goods in the Besley and Ghatak (2001) model. We show that in the dynamic setup the optimal ownership depends not only on the relative valuations for the public good but also on technology (elasticity of investment). We also show that joint ownership of public good can be optimal in both the static and repeated game but it emerges for a different parameter range. Our results are applied to the case of return of cultural goods to their country of origin.

Keywords: public goods; property rights; reputation; joint ownership; cultural goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 H11 H41 L14 L33 Z1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
Date: 2009-01
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bri:cmpowp:09/211

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