Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World

Allan M Feldman and Roberto Serrano
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Roberto Serrano: http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/Allan_Feldman/index.htm

No 2008-8, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we provide two simple new versions of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a model with only one preference profile. Both versions are transparent, requiring minimal mathematical sophistication. The first version assumes there are only two people in society, whose preferences are being aggregated; the second version assumes two or more people. Both theorems rely on assumptions about diversity of preferences, and we explore alternative notions of diversity at some length. Our first theorem also uses a neutrality assumption, commonly used in the literature; our second theorem uses a neutrality/monotonicity assumption, which is stronger and less commonly used. We provide examples to illustrate our points.

Keywords: Arrow's Theorem; single-profile (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-hpe
Date: 2008
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