Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case

Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: We study the strategic behavior of voters in a model of proportional representation, in which the policy space is multidimensional. Our main finding is that in large electorate, under some assumptions on voters'preferences, voters essentially vote, in any equilibrium, only for the extreme parties.

Keywords: Strategic Voting; Proportional Rule; Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Date: 2005-06
Note: ET
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Related works:
Working Paper: EXTREME VOTING UNDER PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION:THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL CASE (2005)
Journal Article: Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0531

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