‘Unfair’ Discrimination in Two-sided Peering? Evidence from LINX

D’Ignazio, Alessio and Emanuele Giovannetti ()

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: Does asymmetry between Internet Providers affect the “fairness” of their interconnection contracts? While recent game theoretic literature provides contrasting answers to this question, there is a lack of empirical research. We introduce a novel dataset on micro-interconnection policies and provide an econometric analysis of the determinants of peering decisions amongst the Internet Service Providers interconnecting at the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX). Our key result shows that two different metrics, introduced to capture asymmetry, exert opposite effects. Asymmetry in “market size” enhances the quality of the link, while asymmetry in “network centrality” induces quality degradation, hence “unfairer” interconnection conditions.

Keywords: Internet Peering; Two-sided Markets; Network Industries; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 L86 L96 C81 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-net
Date: 2006-02
Note: IO
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0621

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