Do Autocratic States Trade Less?

Toke S Aidt () and Martin Gassebner ()

Cambridge Working Papers in Economics from Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge

Abstract: The paper analyzes whether the political regime of a country inuences its involvement in international trade. Firstly, we develop a theoretical model that predicts that autocracies trade less than democracies. Secondly, we test the predictions of the model empirically using a panel of more than 130 countries for the years 1962 to 2000. In contrast to the existing literature, we use data on individual importing and exporting countries, rather than a dyadic set-up. In line with the model, we and that autocracies import substantially less than democracies, even after controlling for official trade policies. This finding is very stable and does not depend on a particular set-up or estimation technique.

Keywords: International trade; democracy; autocracy; gravity model. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F14 O24 P45 P51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-int and nep-pol
Date: 2007-08
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Working Paper: Do Autocratic States Trade Less? (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cam:camdae:0742

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