Frictional Matching: Evidence from Law School Admission

Pascal Courty () and Mario Pagliero

No 113, Carlo Alberto Notebooks from Collegio Carlo Alberto

Abstract: We measure friction in the matching of students and law schools as the number of unnecessary student applications and school admissions that have to be undertaken per actual matriculation. We show that friction increases with student and school attractiveness, but decreases for top schools and students. We discuss connections with the literature on frictional matching.

Keywords: college admission; frictional matching; assortative matching; student portfolio; school standard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu, nep-gth and nep-lab
Date: 2009
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Related works:
Working Paper: Frictional Matching: Evidence from Law School Admission (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cca:wpaper:113

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