Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint

No E2005/10, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section

Abstract: I consider the problem of assigning agents to indivisible objects, in which each agent pays a price for his object and all prices sum to a given constant. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the agents' true preferences. I propose a simple mechanism whereby agents announce valuations for all objects and an envy-free allocation is selected with respect to these announced preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism implements both in Nash and strong Nash equilibrium the set of true envy-free allocations.

Keywords: Indivisible Goods; Envy-Freeness; Implementation; Strong Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written 2005-12
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs/econ/workingpapers/papers/E2005_10.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Double Implementation in a Market for Indivisible Goods with a Price Constraint (2004)
Journal Article: Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Bruce Webb ().