The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

Helmuts Azacis () and David Collie

No E2007/27, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section

Abstract: The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path being allowed to become negative.

Keywords: Optimal punishments; trigger strategies; collusion; cartels (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D43 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2007-10

Published in Economics Letters, Vol. 105, 2009, pp. 56-57.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/carbs/econ/workingpapers/papers/E2007_27.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2007/27

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Bruce Webb ().