Gratuitous Violence and the Rational Offender Model

James S. Foreman-Peck and Simon C. Moore ()

No E2009/12, Cardiff Economics Working Papers from Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section

Abstract: Rational offender models assume that individuals choose whether to offend by weighing the rewards against the chances of apprehension and the penalty if caught. While evidence indicates that rational theory is applicable to acquisitive crimes, the explanatory power for gratuitous non-fatal violent offending has not been evaluated. Lottery-type questions elicited risk attitudes and time preferences from respondents in a street survey. Admitted violent behaviour was predictable on the basis of some of these responses. Consistent with the rational model, less risk averse and more impatient individuals were more liable to violence. Such people were also more likely to be victims of violence. In line with a 'subjective' version of the rational model, respondents with lower estimates of average violence conviction chances and of fines were more prone to be violent.

Keywords: Violence; alcohol; risk; intertemporal choice; rational offending (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D9 K14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
Date: 2009-08
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2009/12

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