Pro cyclicité de la politique budgétaire et surveillance multilatérale dans les unions monétaires africaines

Sylviane Guillaumont Jeanneney () and Sampawende J-A Tapsoba

No 200904, Working Papers from CERDI

Abstract: The devaluation of the CFA Francs in 1994 has highlighted the relevance of fiscal coordination in African monetary unions. After 1994, African monetary unions have adopted a fiscal rule which prescribes a permanent nil or positive budgetary balance. This article studies how this fiscal rule affects the cyclicality of fiscal policies. The results show that compared to other African states, such a fiscal rule creates a pro cyclical bias in public expenditure during recessions. The bias justifies a modification of the rule in order to impose a fiscal surplus during expansions.

Keywords: Africa.; Fiscal policies; Fiscal rules; Pro cyclicality; currency union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-cba and nep-mac
Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1038

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