A Proposal for the Design of the Successor to the Kyoto Protocol

Larry S. Karp and Jinhua Zhao
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Jinhua Zhao: Iowa State University

No 1065, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series from Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley

Abstract: The successor to the Kyoto Protocol should impose national ceilings on rich countries' greenhouse gas emissions and promote voluntary abatement by developing countries. Our proposal gives signatories the option of exercising an escape clause that relaxes their requirement to abate. This feature helps to solve the participation and compliance problems that have weakened the Protocol. We support the use of carefully circumscribed trade restrictions in order to reduce the real or perceived problem of carbon leakage.

Keywords: Kyoto protocol; escape clause; emissions trade; clean development mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-geo, nep-ltv, nep-tra and nep-ure
Date: 2008-06-30
Note: oai:cdlib1:are_ucb-1261
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