When Promoters Like Scalpers

Larry S. Karp and Jeffrey Perloff

No 916R, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series from Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley

Abstract: If a monopoly supplies a perishable good, such as tickets to a performance, and is unable to price discriminate within a period, the monopoly may benefit from the potential entry of resellers. If the monopoly attempts to intertemporally price discriminate, the equilibrium in the game among buyers is indeterminate when the resellers are not allowed to enter, and the monopoly's problem is not well defined. An arbitrarily small amount of heterogeneity of information among the buyers leads to a unique equilibrium. We show how the potential entry of resellers alters this equilibrium.

Keywords: intertemporal price discrimination; scalpers; coordination game; common knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-04-01
Note: oai:cdlib1:are_ucb-1046
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=are_ucb (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Why promoters like scalpers (2000)
Journal Article: When Promoters Like Scalpers (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:agrebk:916r

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series from Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().