"Third Party Contingency" contracts in settlement and litigation

Prof. Dr. Roland Kirstein and Neil Rickman

No 1072, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics

Abstract: We present, for the first time, a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. Recognizing the financing constraints that British cost rules may impose on litigants, these new contractual arrangements combine contingency fees with third party cover for cost in the event of losing the case: we call these "Third Party Contingency" (TPC) contracts. Signing a TPC contract can make filing a suit credible and may increase settlement amounts. This does not, however, increase the likelihood of going to trial, since TPC contracts are only of mutual benefit to the plaintiff and the third party when the case settles out of court. We also find that the mere availability of TPC's may generate the above strategic effect.

Date: 2002-10-23
Note: oai:cdlib1:blewp-1072
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Related works:
Working Paper: Third Party Contingency contracts in settlement and litigation
Journal Article: "Third Party Contingency" Contracts in Settlement and Litigation (2004)
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