Contingent Fees

Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Suzanne Scotchmer
Additional contact information
Daniel L. Rubinfeld: University of California, Berkeley
Suzanne Scotchmer: University of California, Berkeley

No 1145, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics

Abstract: ontingent fees have been controversial throughout legal history. In the United States they are commonly used by the plaintiffs' bar and occasionally by the defence bar. However, such fees are prohibited or substantially restricted in many other common law and civil law legal systems. From a free market perspective, a compelling argument is needed to justify a restriction on contractual arrangements between principals (clients) and agents (attorneys). Yet, many countries have such restrictions, and numerous attempts (some successful) have been made in various states in the US to limit the use of contingent fees. This essay focuses on the normative question of whether the restriction of fee arrangements is economically efficient. We seek, therefore, to evaluate the arguments for prohibition, and to sketch out the circumstances under which the gains from prohibition outweigh the benefits that the freedom to contract is likely to bring to both parties. (forthcoming, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, ed. P. Newman, 1998) Contact the Law and Economics Program at Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 for a copy of this paper.

Date: 1998-04-30
Note: oai:cdlib1:blewp-1145
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://repositories. ... e=1145&context=blewp (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().