The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in the International System

Alan Sykes
Additional contact information
Alan Sykes: University of Chicago

No 1148, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics

Abstract: The traditional instruments of protectionism (tariffs and quotas) are increasingly unimportant in the international economy, owing to the success of trade liberalizing accords such as the WTO/GATT, NAFTA and the Treaty of Rome. The attention of the trading community has accordingly shifted to various "nontariff barriers" to trade, which remain important in many goods sectors and which lie at the heart of impediments to international trade in services. One source of such impediments, indeed perhaps the most important source, is the variation among nations in their domestic regulatory policies - what I term "regulatory heterogenity." In many ways, regulatory harmonization might seem the most straightforward solution to the trade problems associated with regulatory heterogenity, however, such harmonization rarely occurs, especially at the global level. This paper asks why, and further inquires whether the absence of greater regulatory harmonization is unfortunate. Contact the Law and Economics Program at Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 for a copy of this paper.

Date: 1995-09-30
Note: oai:cdlib1:blewp-1148

Downloads: (external link)
http://repositories. ... e=1148&context=blewp (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().