Relational Contracts

Melvin Eisenberg
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Melvin Eisenberg: Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley

No 1156, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series from Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics

Abstract: Over the last 25 years, a great deal has been written about relational contracts. Much of the literature is devoted to explaining, on economic and sociological grounds, why parties might want to enter into contracts with rational elements. Although many of these explanations are insightful and illuminating, the literature has failed to show that there is a set of legal rules that should be applied to some contracts (relational) but not others (nonrelational). This paper explains why such a showing cannot be made. (in Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law, ed. Jack Beatson and Daniel Friedman, Clarendon Press, 1995). Please contact the Program in Law and Economics at Boalt Hall School of Law, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 for a copy of this paper.

Date: 1995-05-03
Note: oai:cdlib1:blewp-1156

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