On a Market for Coalitions with Indivisible Agents and Lotteries

Rod Garratt () and Cheng-Zhong Qin ()

University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara

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Journal Article: On a Market for Coalitions with Indivisible Agents and Lotteries (1997)
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