Evolution of Behavior in Family Games

Ted Bergstrom ()

No 2000A, University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara

Abstract: William Hamilton developed the biological theory of kin selection before game theory became familiar to biologists. Thus he implicitly confined his analysis to a rather special subclass of games, with linear structure. This paper shows that while Hamilton's rule does not apply to a more general class of games, there is a useful generalization that does apply. This paper also generalizes results in my 1995 AER paper on sibling interaction from symmetric two-player games to multiplayer games that may be asymmetric.

Keywords: evolutionary game theory; kin selection; Hamilton's rule; economics of family (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-03-01
Note: oai:cdlib1:

Downloads: (external link)
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1143&context=ucsbecon (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Evolution of Bihavior in Family Games (1995)
Working Paper: Evolution of Behavior in Family Games (2001)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:2000a

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().