The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation

Ted Bergstrom ()

No 2001A, University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara

Abstract: This paper explores the quantitative relation between non random, assortative matching and the maintenance of cooperative behavior under evolutionary dynamics. It considers a population of individuals who are hardwired to play either cooperate or defect. They meet other individuals according to some random process and play their programmed strategy in a game of Prisoners' Dilemma. The type that gets the higher expected payoff reproduces more rapidly. The paper defines an index of assortativity of encounters and develops an "algebra of assortative encounters." The paper also calculates the index of assortativity for games between relatives with either cultural or genetic inheritance and shows the logical connection between the index of assortativity and Hamilton's theory of kin selection. The index of assortativity is used to determine the population dynamics when players select their partners, using partially informative cues about each others' types.

Keywords: assortative matching; evolutionary game theory; evolution of cooperation; index of assortativity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-01-27
Note: oai:cdlib1:
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1134&context=ucsbecon (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation (2001)
Working Paper: The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation
Working Paper: The Algebra of Assortative Encounters and the Evolution of Cooperation (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:2001a

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().