Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete and Sophistication in Experimental "Hide and Seek" Games

Vincent P. Crawford and Nagore Iriberri
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Nagore Iriberri: University of California, San Diego

No 2004-12, University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, UC San Diego

Abstract: Rubinstein, Tversky, and Heller elicited subjects' initial responses to games in which a Hider and a Seeker choose simultaneously among four locations, with the Seeker winning a given amount if he chooses the same location as the Hider and the Hider otherwise winning that amount. The game has a unique equilibrium, in which both players randomize uniformly over locations; but the design framed locations non-neutrally and subjects deviated systematically from equilibrium in ways that were highly sensitive to the framing. This paper compares alternative explanations of the results and proposes a structural non-equilibrium model of initial responses to explain them

Keywords: Experimental Game Theory; Framing Effects; Focal Points; Bounded Rationality; Strategic Sophistication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
Date: 2004-09-29
Note: oai:cdlib1.org:ucsdecon-1029
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Related works:
Working Paper: Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games (2004)
Working Paper: Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games (2004)
Working Paper: Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games (2005)
Working Paper: Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games (2004)
Working Paper: Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental Hide-and-Seek Games (2006)
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