The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Strategic Choice

Martin Dufwenberg (), Simon Gaechter () and Hennig-Schmidt, Heike ()
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Martin Dufwenberg: University of Arizona
Simon Gaechter: University of Nottingham
Hennig-Schmidt, Heike: University of Bonn
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Simon Gächter ()

No 2006-20, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: Psychological game theory can provide a rational choice explanation of framing effects; frames influence beliefs, and beliefs influence motivations. We explain this point theoretically, and explore its empirical relevance experimentally. In a 2×2-factorial framing design of one-shot public good experiments we show that frames affect subject’s first- and second-order beliefs, and contributions. From a psychological game-theoretic framework we derive two mutually compatible hypotheses about guilt aversion and reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order beliefs, respectively. Our results are consistent with either.

Keywords: Framing; psychological games; guilt aversion; reciprocity; public good games; voluntary cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C72 D64 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-soc and nep-upt
Date: 2006-10
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2006-20

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