Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States

Iris Bohnet (), Fiona Greig (), Benedikt Herrmann () and Richard Zeckhauser ()
Additional contact information
Iris Bohnet: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Fiona Greig: Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Benedikt Herrmann: School of Economics, University of Nottingham

No 2007-08, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: Due to betrayal aversion, people take risks less willingly when the agent of uncertainty is another person rather than nature. Individuals in six countries (Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States) confronted a binary-choice trust game or a risky decision offering the same payoffs and probabilities. Risk acceptance was calibrated by asking individuals their “minimum acceptable probability” (MAP) for securing the high payoff that would make them willing to accept the risky rather than the sure payoff. People’s MAPs are generally higher when another person rather than nature determines the outcome. This indicates betrayal aversion.

JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cna, nep-cwa, nep-exp and nep-upt
Date: 2007-10
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Journal Article: Betrayal Aversion: Evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2007-08

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