Framing and Free Riding: Emotional Responses and Punishment in Social Dilemma Games

Robin Cubitt, Michalis Drouvelis () and Simon Gächter ()

No 2008-02, Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham

Abstract: In this paper, we report an experimental investigation of the effect of framing on social preferences, as revealed in a one-shot linear public goods game. We use two indicators to measure social preferences: self-reported emotional responses; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval, punishment. Our findings are that, for a given pattern of contributions, neither punishment nor emotion depends on the Give versus Take framing that we manipulate. To this extent, they suggest that the social preferences we observe are robust to framing effects.

Keywords: framing effects; punishment; emotions; public goods experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D01 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Date: 2008-03

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/cedex/papers/2008-02.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2008-02

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Alex Possajennikov ().