Eliciting Socially Optimal Rankings from Unfair Jurors

Pablo Amoros ()

No E2006/10, Economic Working Papers at Centro de Estudios Andaluces from Centro de Estudios Andaluces

Abstract: A jury must provide a ranking of contestants (students applying for scholarships or Ph. D. programs, gymnasts in a competition, etc.). There exists a true ranking which is common knowledge among the jurors, but it is not verifiable. The socially optimal rule is that the contestants be ranked according to the true ranking. The jurors are not impartial and, for example, may have friends (contestants that they would like to benefit) and enemies (contestants that they would like to prejudice). We study necessary and sufficient conditions on the jury under which the socially optimal rule is Nash implementable. We also propose a simple mechanism that Nash implements the socially optimal rule under these conditions.

Keywords: Ranking of contestants; Implementation Theory; Nash Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
Date: 2006
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Journal Article: Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors (2009)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cea:doctra:e2006_10

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